Policymakers and organizations representing people with disabilities have highlighted the importance of promoting the employment prospects of disabled individuals as a determinant to ensure their broader integration into the society. Policy reforms that attempt to incentivise disabled individuals to work typically involve reduced financial punishments for earning above a predetermined threshold (substantial gainful activity). This paper exploits a Spanish reform that entirely eliminated any disincentives for disabled individuals to work. Partially disabled individuals in Spain are subject to income taxation in all regions except in the province of Bizkaia. Before 2007, partially disabled individuals in Bizkaia were exempt from income taxation if they did not work. In December 2006, a new law was passed in Bizkaia that distinguished between individuals aged 55 or younger, who were no longer tax-exempt, and those who were older than 55 years, who continued to be tax-exempt if they did not work. I exploit this change in the legislation and employ both a difference-in-difference strategy comparing the employment outcomes of disabled young men across provinces and time as well as a triple difference model with disabled men older than 55 years, who are unaffected by the policy. My results show that the reform increased the probability of working by 6.5 percentage points for disabled men aged 55 or younger.
were 44% in the OECD whereas employment rates for nondisabled individuals were 75% (OECD, 2010) . Thus, raising the employment levels of disabled individuals has been identified as one of the most relevant challenges facing developed countries in terms of disability policies (OECD, 2010) .
A number of elements embedded in disability systems have been partially blamed for the observed low employment rates cited above. 1 For example, although a number of countries allow partially disabled workers to combine the receipt of benefits with working (Spain), some other countries (such as the United States) have set a maximum limit on earnings (substantial gainful activity [SGA] ) above which disabled workers lose their benefits. Thus, there has been increased interest among public institutions in fostering the reintegration of disabled individuals into the workforce, and some new policies have been enacted in pursuit of this aim (see below examples for Norway, USA, and Canada). In parallel, a recent strand of literature has analysed the effects of reforms that aim to promote the labour market integration of disabled workers by increasing these individuals' financial incentives to work. 2 However, in all of these initiatives, there are still some financial disincentives in place if the individual decides to work above the SGA threshold. Thus, in this paper I exploit a Spanish reform that abolished all negative consequences associated with working for disabled individuals. Partially disabled individuals in Spain are subject to income taxation in all regions except in the province of Bizkaia. Before 2007, partially disabled individuals in Bizkaia were exempt from income taxation if they did not work. In December 2006, a new law was passed in Bizkaia. This new law made a distinction between individuals aged 55 or younger, who were not tax-exempt any longer, and those who were older than 55 years, who continued to be tax exempt if they did not work. Thus, I exploit this change in the legislation to identify the employment effects of abolishing all financial penalties associated with having a job for disabled workers. I apply both a difference-in-difference model comparing employment outcomes of affected individuals (men aged 55 or below) in Bizkaia and the rest of Spain before and after the introduction of the policy as well as a triple difference model using men above the age of 55 years old, who were unaffected by the policy change. My results show that the reform increases the probability of working by 6.5 percentage points for disabled men aged 55 or below. It has to be noted that this result comes from two channels: the abolishment of the financial disincentives to work and the drop in income resulting from the requirement to pay income taxation. Furthermore, I explore the existence of any inflow effect into the Disability Insurance (DI) system as a result of the policy changes introduced in 2007. Although the inflow into the DI system increases during the years following the introduction of the policy, the triple difference-in-difference specification does not provide evidence of the existence of an inflow effect into DI as a result of the policy change. Finally, I analyse the employment effects of the subgroup of disabled men who were already in the DI system before the introduction of the reform, as they have very low employment rates. My results are consistent with the recent literature that reports positive employment outcomes from financial incentives to work. For example, Kostøl and Mogstad (2014) analyse a reform implemented by the Norwegian government in 2005 that allowed new DI recipients to reduce their benefits by $0.6 for every $1 in earnings above the SGA level; they find an increase of 8.5 percentage points in the labour force participation of DI recipients in the 18-49 age bracket. Weathers and Hemmeter (2011) evaluate the employment effects of a pilot project led by the Social Security Administration that replaced the complete loss of benefits for individuals who work above the SGA level with a gradual reduction of $1 for every $2 earned above the SGA threshold 3 . Their results show that this policy increased the percentage of individuals with earnings above the SGA by 25%. 4 Finally, Campolieti and Riddell (2012) compare the employment outcomes of disabled individuals in two regions in Canada to determine the impact of two policy changes introduced in only one of the regions, Quebec. The policy changes are the introduction of an SGA threshold (in 2001) and automatic reinstatement of benefits (in 2005) if the person stopped working in the subsequent 24 months. Their findings point to important employment effects from the introduction of the SGA threshold (increases in employment probability of 5.1 and 5.7 percentage points for men and of 7.9 and 9.5 for women) whereas no significant effects are reported for the introduction of automatic reinstatement of disability benefits. However, my results go one step further than the previous literature and provide novel evidence of the employment effects of a different policy reform, tax exemptions, that has been overlooked in the literature on financial incentives for disabled workers until now. Furthermore, this is the first paper that analyses a policy that managed to abolish all financial disincentives to work.
| THE SPANISH DI SYSTEM
The disability system in Spain distinguishes between two types of long-term disability benefits: (a) contributory, which are given to individuals who have generally contributed to the Social Security system before the onset of the disabling condition, and (b) noncontributory, which are given to individuals who are determined to be disabled but have never contributed to the Social Security system (or do not reach the minimum contributory requirement to access the contributory system). Noncontributory disability benefits are means-tested and managed at the regional level.
5 As I want to assess the effect of disability on employment and the noncontributory disability system is means-tested, in the remainder of the paper, I focus only on the permanent contributory disability system in Spain.
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The Social Security Administration defines permanent contributive disability insurance as the economic benefits provided to compensate an individual for losing a certain amount of wages or professional earnings when affected by a permanent reduction or complete loss of his/her working ability due to the effects of a pathological or traumatic process derived from an illness or accident.
To capture the different situations that can follow the onset of a disabling condition, the Spanish Social Security Administration uses a classification system comprising three main degrees of disability that depend on the working capacity lost 7 :
1. Partial disability (57% of claimants): The individual is impaired and unable to perform all or the fundamental tasks of his/ her usual job or professional activity, but he/she is still capable of performing a different job or professional activity. 2. Total disability (40% of claimants): The individual is impaired and unable to perform any type of job or professional activity. 3. Severe disability (3% of claimants): Individuals, who, as a result of anatomic or functional losses, need the assistance of a third person to perform essential activities of daily living such as eating and moving.
| Eligibility and benefit amounts
The eligibility requirements and the pension amount depend on the source of the disability (ordinary illness, work-related orunrelated accident, or occupational illness), the level of the disability and the person's age at the onset of the disabling condition. Table 1A in the appendix summarises the main parameters of both the eligibility criteria and the benefits formula. The total amount of the benefit is obtained by multiplying a percentage that varies depending on the type and the degree of the disability by the regulatory base, which depends on the source of the disabling condition and on previous salaries. 8 The 5 Income is evaluated yearly. The income threshold in 2010 was set at 4,755.80 euros/year for an individual living alone. This amount is adjusted if the individual lives with other members. The size of the noncontributory system is relatively small compared to the contributory system (197,126 individuals received noncontributory disability benefits in 2009, whereas 920,860 received contributory benefits during the same year).
6 Additionally, my data do not include information on noncontributory disability benefits. 7 There is a fourth degree of disability benefits (permanent limited disability), but this type has already ended, and it only consisted of a one-time lump sum payment.
8 Benefit = Regulatory Base × Percentage. This formula was multiplied by an additional percentage (which depends on the number of years of contributions and age) from 2008. However, this change was applied in all Spanish provinces so that any effect of this policy reform will be cancelled out in my estimation, which exploits differences across Spanish provinces.
percentage is 55% or 75% for partial disability beneficiaries, 100% for total disability, and 150% for severe disability. Partial disability beneficiaries receive 55% of the regulatory base, but this percentage can be increased to 75% for individuals who are older than 55 and have difficulties in finding a job due to lack of education or due to the characteristics of the social and labour market of the region where they live.
| Tax system and reform for disabled individuals
In Spain, disability benefits are granted, administered, and funded at the national level. However, some regions have certain degree of autonomy in taxation issues. There are 52 provinces in Spain. Individuals receiving total disability benefits are exempt from income taxation in all Spanish provinces. 9,10 In contrast, partially disabled individuals are subject to income taxation in all Spanish regions except the province of Bizkaia. Before 2007, partially disabled individuals in Bizkaia were exempt from income taxation if they did not work. In December 2006, a new law was passed in Bizkaia. The new law distinguished between individuals aged 55 or younger, who were not tax-exempt any longer, and those who were older than 55 years, who continued to be tax exempt if they did not work (see Table 1 ). The law came into effect in January 2007 and was not discussed very much in regional television or newspapers before its introduction, as it coincided with the Christmas holiday period. In the rest of the Spanish provinces, there was no change in the law and, thus, partially disabled individuals continued to be subject to income taxation.
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Therefore, partially disabled individuals aged 55 or younger in Bizkaia went from tax-exempt if not working to not tax exempt, whereas individuals older than 55 years continued to be tax-exempt if not working. Thus, in this paper, I exploit this differential tax treatment between Bizkaia and the rest of Spain to quantify the potential employment effects of abolishing all the monetary disincentives associated with working. It must be noted that the mean partial disability benefit in Bizkaia is 1001 euros/month (1,001 × 14 payments = 14,014 euros/year). As average income taxation for this income bracket is 24.4% in Spain, the amount paid in income taxes would be approximately 3,419 euros/year. Thus, this represents a significant percentage of the amount received as disability benefits.
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| DATABASE AND SAMPLE SELECTION
The study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives ("Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales," MCVL) which is a microeconomic dataset based on administrative records provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration. It contains a random sample of 4% of all the individuals who, at some point during 2011, had contributed to the social security system (either by working or being on an unemployment scheme) or had received a contributory benefit. The random sample selected contains over one million people.
The data contain information on the entire employment and benefit histories of the workers, including the exact duration of employment; unemployment and disability pension spells; and for each spell, several variables that describe the characteristics of the job or the unemployment/disability benefits. There is also some information on personal characteristics such as age, gender, nationality, and level of education.
My sample includes all men who were receiving partial disability benefits between 2002 and 2011. I follow their labour market status for each year that they receive the benefits until 2011 or until they reach age 65 (when they are automatically transferred to the old-age pension system).
13 I consider an individual employed if he/she is observed as working at some point during that year. I only consider men in my estimation as the employment probabilities of partially disabled women are extremely low in Spain (although 42% of men aged 55 or younger work in my sample, only 19% of partially disabled women in the same age group work; additionally, for some years of my sample, the employment rate of partially disabled women above age 55 in the treated province was 0%, so I cannot properly estimate the triple difference model for women).
The treatment status corresponds to partially disabled men living in Bizkaia. I consider two control groups: In the first, I include information on all provinces in Spain (except Guipuzkoa, as explained above) whereas in the second, I restrict the control group to include the five neighbouring provinces of Bizkaia (Alava, Navarra, Burgos, La Rioja, and Cantabria) ( Figure 1 ).
Therefore, when I include all the provinces in Spain in the control group, I have 12,511 individuals in my sample (65,887 person-year observations). When I restrict the sample to the six provinces cited above (the five neighbouring plus the affected province), I have 974 individuals in the sample (5,010 person-year observations).
| EMPIRICAL MODEL
The financial disincentives to work were abolished from 2007 onwards in the province of Bizkaia for individuals aged 55 or younger. Therefore, I will exploit the reform in Bizkaia to apply a difference-in-difference model to quantify the employment effects of eliminating all financial penalties to work for disabled individuals. Thus, I first restrict the sample to include only individuals aged 55 or younger and estimate the following model:
The dependent variable, W it , is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is employed in year t. The model includes province fixed effects (α), year fixed effects (δ), and an error term (ε). As covariates, the model includes the age of the individual, a dummy for whether the individual is an immigrant, the educational level of the disabled, the logarithm of the amount of benefits received, 14 a dummy variable that captures whether the individual lives in a city or in a rural area, and a variable that captures the time (in years) that the individual has been on the disability rolls. 15 As the reform was passed at the end of 2006 (December) and came into effect in January 2007, I consider 2007 as the first postreform year. Therefore, the coefficient β 1 will capture the effects of the policy change by comparing employment outcomes of young men in Bizkaia after the implementation 12 These types of policies are common in a large number of countries. Some countries also have income tax deductions for disabled individuals (such as India) whereas other countries have other types of tax deductions and income exclusions for disabled individuals (such as in the United States). See the OECD report "Transforming disability into ability: Policies to promote work and income security for disabled people," (OECD, 2003) . 13 The youngest age at which you can work in Spain is 16 years old so that the sample includes individuals aged between 16 and 65 years old. 13 The youngest age at which you can work in Spain is 16 years old so that the sample includes individuals aged between 16 and 65 years old.
14 As the amount of benefits is calculated as a percentage of past wages, this variable will capture part of the previous experience that the individual had in the labour market before entering the disability system. 15 We have data from 1997 onwards, but we also know the exact year in which the workers entered the disability rolls. The key identifying assumption of difference-in-difference models is that employment outcomes for disabled young men in Bizkaia would have experienced the same evolution as employment outcomes of young men in the rest of the Spanish provinces if the policy change had not been implemented. The first concern that may invalidate this assumption comes from the fact that Bizkaia is a northern province and has several characteristics that make it different from provinces in the south of Spain. For example, if we look at Table 2 , which plots the mean of several variables for treated and nontreated provinces, we can spot several differences in some of the variables, such as the proportion of individuals with a higher education degree in the treated and control regions. For this reason, I estimate the same model but including only the neighbouring provinces of Bizkaia (Alava, Cantabria, Navarra, La Rioja, and Burgos). We can see in Table 2 that when I restrict the control group to include only those five provinces, the means of some of the variables, such as the proportion of men with higher education, become more similar in the treatment and control groups. An additional concern that may threaten the fulfilment of the identifying assumption stems from the fact that any potential effects that I find may be due to specific shocks-other than the policy reform-that only affect Bizkaia. Although the economic crisis in Spain officially started after the reform (in the third quarter of 2008), part of the postreform period coincides with the first part of Spain's strong economic recession. Thus, it could be the case that the labour market impact of the economic downturn was different in Bizkaia than in the other provinces in Spain. To try to isolate the effects of the reform from those other confounding factors, I employ two strategies. First, I exploit the fact that the policy only affected individuals aged 55 or younger and use men older than 55 to implement a triple difference-in-difference model. Thus, the identifying assumption now entails that any labour market shock in Bizkaia is going to affect both disabled men above and below age 55, which is a much more difficult assumption to violate.
The second strategy that I use is to estimate the same model for nondisabled workers. I use this specification as a placebo test. If my results are driven by any unobserved factors that affect the labour market only in Bizkaia and not in neighbouring provinces, I should find the same differential labour market impact for nondisabled individuals.
| BASELINE RESULTS
| Employment outcomes
I begin by providing, in Figures 2-5, graphical evidence of the proportion of partially disabled men working before and after the implementation of the reform in 2007. Treatment is always defined as individuals living in the province that introduced the policy change, Bizkaia. The dots represent the raw data whereas the lines represent the connections between the data points. Figure 2 plots the fraction of disabled men aged 55 or younger working in treated and control provinces. I begin by including in the control group the rest of the provinces in Spain (except Guipuzcoa). I can see that, before the reform, men aged 55 or younger had similar employment levels in Bizkaia and the rest of Spain whereas, once the policy was introduced in 2006, there was a sharp increase in the probability of working for partially disabled men in Bizkaia. The graphs very clearly show similar prereform trends, so that the parallel trends assumption is not violated in my setting. To take into account any labour market shocks that may differentially affect the treated province at the exact same time as the introduction of the reform, Figure 3 not only shows the same graph but also includes the proportion of men older than 55 who are working in the treated and control provinces before and after the reform. As we would expect, we can clearly see that there is no change in the employment of men above 55 in either the control or the treated province, as the policy did not affect men in this age group. This graphical evidence reinforces the idea that there was no other labour market change at the same time as the reform that could have affected disabled men in the province of Bizkaia differently than disabled men in the other provinces in Spain. Figures 4 and 5 present the same graphs as Figures 2 and 3 , but the control group only includes the five neighbouring provinces of Bizkaia. Although the employment levels of disabled men aged 55 or younger are now different in the control group before the introduction of the policy (as it only includes the neighbouring provinces), we can still see a large increase in the proportion of men working in Bizkaia just after the introduction of the reform. Again, in Figure 4 , we can see quite convincing evidence that the parallel trend assumption is satisfied in my setting.
16 Table 3 reports the main baseline results. The first two columns include only men aged 55 or below in the treated and control provinces. The first column includes all provinces in Spain in the control group whereas the second column includes only the five neighbouring provinces in the control group. The coefficient treat*after identifies the impact of the policy for men aged 55 or younger in Bizkaia. We can see that, in both the first and second columns, the impact of the policy is positive and significant. The size of the coefficients is bigger when I use as controls only the neighbouring provinces. Thus, the difference-in-difference results suggest that the policy increased the probability of working by 5.7 percentage points or 10 percentage points, depending on the definition of control group that I use. The third and fourth columns of Table 3 report the results of the triple difference specification when we compare men aged 55 or younger with men older than 55 years in treated and control provinces before and after the introduction of the policy. As we can see, the coefficient capturing the effect of the policy (the triple interaction between men aged 55 or younger, living in Bizkaia, after the policy) has a positive and significant sign in both specifications. Moreover, the size of the coefficient is very similar in both specifications when I use the rest of the provinces in Spain as the control group (Column 3) as well as when I use only the five neighbouring provinces in the control group (Column 4). Thus, my preferred specification (triple difference) reports an increase in the probability of working by 6.5 percentage points for disabled men aged 55 or younger as a result of the reform. The mean employment rate for men in this age group in the treated province before the reform is 39.07, which implies that the policy increased the probability of working for treated men by 16.6%. These results are in line with what the literature has found for other countries when analysing a different policy, changes in the SGA level. For example, Kostøl and Mogstad (2014) find an increase in employment by 8.5 percentage points for a slightly younger population group (ages 18-49) in Norway. Weathers and Hemmeter (2011) find an increase in employment by 25% for the United States whereas Campolieti and Riddell (2012) estimate and increase in employment by 5.1-5.7 percentage points in Canada.
5.2 | Probability of entering the disability system: inflow effect Hoynes and Moffitt (1999) note an additional unexpected but interesting impact of changes in disability rules. When discussing the potential impact of reforms that increase the allowable earnings of disability beneficiaries, the authors point to the potential increase in the number of people applying to the disability benefit system. Using a similar argument, it may also be the case that the abolition of all financial disincentives to work could provide incentives for some workers to apply to the disability system. My hypothesis is that this potential induced entry effect would be particularly appealing to workers aged 55 or younger who have preexisting health problems. To check the existence of incentive effects to enter the disability system as a result of the policy change, I select a sample of nondisabled men from 2002 to 2011. I estimate a similar model as before but with a different outcome variable that captures entrance into DI. The dependent variable is a binary outcome that equals 1 if the individual reports receiving a disability benefit in the current period but not in the previous one and zero otherwise. 17 As before, I first present some graphical evidence of the evolution of DI entrance in the treated and control provinces before and after the implementation of the reform. Figure 6 shows the proportion of men aged 55 or younger entering the disability system in the treated and control regions (when control is defined as all regions in Spain). We can see that there seems to be an increase in the proportion of men entering the disability system in the treated province after the introduction of the reform. However, when I include in the graph the evolution of DI inflow for men older than 55 years in the treated and control regions (Figure 7 ). the evidence of the impact of the reform becomes less clear. Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis capturing what is plotted in Figures 6 and 7 . In the first and second columns, I estimate a positive and significant inflow effect of the policy change. That is, when I estimate a difference-in-difference model with a control group that includes either the rest of the provinces in Spain or the five neighbouring provinces, I do find that the reform provided incentives for men aged 55 or younger to join the DI system. However, when I implement the triple difference model in Columns 3 and 4, the results are not significant anymore, as suggested by Figure 7 . Thus, I conclude that I cannot attribute the increase in the DI inflow of men aged 55 or younger in Bizkaia to the impact of the policy because men older than 55 (who are unaffected by the policy) exhibit a similar inflow behaviour.
Finally, I try to quantify the size of the employment impact for those who were already in the disability system before the reform was introduced. Even if there is no significant inflow effect from the policy, the composition of those entering the DI system could be affected by the policy change. 18 It is important to know the extent to which those already in the DI system before the reform can be incentivized to work without taking into account that the new entrants may have higher employment probabilities. This is especially relevant in the Spanish case as individuals in the disability system have very low employment rates. Thus, I estimate the same models for the probability of working as in Table 3 but restrict the sample to those who were already in the disability system before the policy change in 2007. That is, I use the same sample as in Section 5.1 except for the fact that I drop those individuals who entered the disability system between 2007 and 2011. In Table 5 , we can see that the employment effects are still positive and significant for disabled men who were already in the DI system before the 17 Of course, we do not use any of the covariates that capture some dimension of the disability benefit received by the individual, as we have both disabled and nondisabled individuals in this sample. 18 For instance, individuals with a disability that were very attached to the labour market could have been discouraged from entering the disability system before the reform because of the employment conditionality condition embedded in the income taxation system in Bizkaia. introduction of the reform. The size of the coefficient is slightly smaller than in the results using the entire sample. We can see that the probability of working increased by 4.6 percentage points in the triple difference specification with the rest of Spain as the control group. The coefficient of the triple difference model with only six provinces is also positive but is not significant anymore because the standard errors get bigger (potentially partly due to the reduction in the sample size). Thus, I conclude that even those disabled individuals who received partial DI benefits before the reform, who have very low employment probabilities, are somewhat incentivized to find a job after the reform, when they are no longer required to stop working to obtain their tax exemption. Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
| ROBUSTNESS CHECK S: PLACEBO TEST FOR NONDISABLED INDIVIDUALS
Even with the triple difference strategy, concerns may persist that some labour market development in the treated province could have affected older and younger workers differently at the same time that the policy reform was introduced. If that was the case, the observed differences in employment outcomes between younger and older men in Bizkaia and the rest of the Spanish provinces could be the result of this specific labour market development. Then, my results would overestimate the impact of the reform. Thus, to take this concern into account, I have selected a sample of nondisabled men aged 55 or younger from the same time as my original sample of disabled individuals. Therefore, I apply the same models as in my baseline regressions in Table 3 to analyse the existence of these province-and age-specific labour market shocks in the treated and control provinces that would be biasing my estimates of the reform. The assumption underlying this placebo test is that any labour market shock affecting younger workers in the treated province would have an impact on both disabled and nondisabled workers and, thus, should also provide significant effects on the estimates for nondisabled workers. As seen in Table 6 , there is a small significant impact in employment probabilities for nondisabled individuals when we use as the control group the rest of provinces in Spain. However, I cannot find any significant impact for the case of nondisabled workers in any of the specifications that include only the six closest provinces. Neither the difference-in-difference nor the triple difference models show any significant impact of the policy for nondisabled men. Moreover, in Table 7 , I perform an additional robustness check-in which I simulate the policy to have taken place in 2004 and 2005 instead of the true year of introduction of the policy (2007). As it can be seen, the triple difference coefficients are not significant in these additional placebo tests. Graphical evidence of these placebo tests is presented in Figure 8 where the parallel evolution of employment rates of disabled individuals in treated and control regions can be observed for the years 2004 and 2005. In order to take into account potential differential trends over time in each specific province, in Table 8, I repeat the baseline results presented in Table 3 with the inclusion, as further controls, of province-specific linear trends. Although the inclusion of these additional province-specific trends could capture some of the effects of the policy, we can see that the results of the triple difference models are almost identical than our baseline results both with respect to the size of the coefficients as well as to the significance levels.
I believe that the results of these placebo tests provide additional evidence that reinforces the validity of my baseline estimates of the impact of the reform shown in Table 3 . Finally, although migration between provinces may be a concern with a Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.x *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
sample of nondisabled individuals, I have reasons to believe that this is not an important worry for the case of disabled individuals. Although I do not have information on migration patterns specifically for disabled workers in my database, in a survey of "Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency" that was collected in Spain in 2008, I know that only 8% of disabled Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
individuals in Spain report to have moved their place of residency. From those that move, 50% state that the move was with the objective to get closer to a family member and 25% move in order to avoid architectonical barriers to access their building. Thus, employment migration for disabled individuals in Spain is likely to be very small.
| CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Policymakers and organizations representing people with disabilities have highlighted the importance of promoting the employment prospects of disabled individuals as a determinant factor to ensure their integration into society as a whole. Yet there is now strong empirical evidence showing that disabled individuals have lower employment rates than their nondisabled counterparts across the developed world (OECD, 2010). Thus, there has been increased interest from public institutions in fostering the reintegration of disabled individuals into the workforce, and some new policies have been enacted in pursuit of this aim. In parallel, scholars have studied some of the reforms that promote the labour market integration of disabled workers by providing financial incentives to work. The main aim of these policy initiatives has been to mitigate the monetary penalties associated with having a job while receiving disability benefits. However, all of these initiatives still maintain a degree of financial punishment if the individual decides to work above a certain wage threshold (the so-called substantial gainful activity level). In this paper, I exploit the first reform that entirely abolished the negative consequences associated with working for disabled individuals. This reform was introduced in Spain in 2007 and affected one of the 52 Spanish provinces, Bizkaia. Before 2007, partially disabled individuals in Bizkaia were exempt from income taxation if they did not work. In December 2006, a new law was passed in Bizkaia. This new law distinguished between individuals aged 55 or younger, who were no longer tax-exempt, and those who were older than 55 years, who remained tax-exempt if they did not work. In the rest of the Spanish provinces, partially disabled individuals were always subject to income taxation during my sample period. Thus, I exploit this change in the legislation to identify the employment effects of abolishing all financial penalties associated with working for disabled workers. I apply both a difference-in-difference model comparing the employment outcomes of affected individuals (men aged 55 or younger) in Bizkaia and the rest of Spain before and after the introduction of the policy as well as a triple difference model that also includes men above the age of 55 years old, who were unaffected by the policy change. My results show that the reform increases the probability of working by 6.5 percentage points for disabled men aged 55 or below. It has to be noted that this result comes from two channels: the abolishment of the financial disincentives to work and the drop in income resulting from the requirement to pay income taxation. Furthermore, I explore the existence of any inflow effect into the DI system as a result of the policy changes introduced in 2007. Although inflow into the DI system increases in the years following the introduction of the policy, the triple difference-in-difference specification does not provide evidence of the existence of an inflow effect into DI as a result of the policy change. Even if the inflow is not affected by the reform, the population of entrants into the disability system could be affected by the reform. Thus, I restrict the sample to include only partially disabled individuals who were already in the DI system before the introduction of the reform and analyse the employment effects for this group of disabled men. Partially disabled individuals in Spain have very low employment rates. Thus, I believe that it is important to understand how this particular group of individuals can be reintegrated into the labour market. My results show that those young disabled men who were already in the DI system when the policy reform was introduced are also increasing their employment rates (by 4.6 percentage points) as a result of the policy change. Although I do not have good data on earnings, I develop some back of the envelope calculation using data on regulatory bases and find that the increase in employment earnings for the affected group of workers amounts to 16% of their prereform earnings level. This is valuable information for policymakers considering reforms that aim at promoting the labour market integration of individuals receiving disability benefits as, for example, lifting the gainful employment cap. Providing adequate monetary incentives together with the elimination of any type of disincentives to work prove to be a successful policy to raise the employment rates of this disadvantaged group. As stressed above, the potential benefits of these policies for disabled individuals and their families go well beyond the labour market effects.
Finally, although this analysis is performed for a specific segment of the population (disabled individuals), I believe that my results can provide some guidance on the labour market impacts of eliminating the financial penalties associated with employment for other segments of the population who are also receiving public benefits and who have very low employment rates (such as partial retirees). If anything, my results provide a lower bound estimate of the remaining capacity to work of public benefit recipients who face monetary disincentives to work.
